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I. INTRODUCTION
It is easy to understand why Americans, especially Floridi-
ans, are interested in investing in Cuban real estate. The beauti-
ful island is the largest in the Caribbean and is located just ninety
miles off the coast of Key West, waiting to be exploited by savvy
real estate investors and developers who foresee substantial gains
based on proximity and underdevelopment. At one time, these
Cuban real estate opportunities were completely available to
American investment.1 However, in 1959, Fidel Castro and his
revolutionaries defeated the Batista government and secured con-
trol over Cuba.2 Thereafter, the communist expropriation of land,
1. Antonio R. Zamora, Foreign Investment in Cuba: A U.S. Perspective, PROB. &
PROP., Dec. 2000, at 57-58.
2. John J. Coughlin, Cuban Foreign Investment Act: Opportunities for United
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the Cold War, and the restrictions under U.S. and Cuban law all
precluded Americans from conducting any commercial transac-
tions with Cuba,3 including investment in real estate.
In recent years, however, the provisions of U.S. law restrict-
ing American investment in Cuba have been harshly criticized.
Further, the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union
eliminated most of Cuba's financial support, causing the Cuban
government to make significant legal changes in order to attract
foreign investment. 4 Unfortunately, despite the widespread inter-
national criticism of American law and the encouraging Cuban
legal development, considerable obstacles in both U.S. and Cuban
law have persevered and will continue to effectively prevent
American investment in Cuban real estate.
This comment examines the various legal obstacles to Ameri-
can investment in Cuban real estate. Part II, focusing on U.S.
law, briefly reviews the legal history and analyzes the legal
restrictions on American investment in Cuba, as well as the possi-
ble methods of eliminating such obstacles. Part III, concentrating
on Cuban law, gives a short summary of the development of
Cuban law and examines both current and future legal barriers to
foreign investment in Cuban land. Finally, Part IV offers conclu-
sions regarding the elimination of both nations' legal obstacles
and when Americans will be allowed and inclined to invest in
Cuban real estate.
II. U.S. LAW
A. U.S. Legal History and Development
After Castro assumed power, the Cuban government expro-
priated all property owned by United States citizens and corpora-
tions without any compensation.5 In response to the confiscations,
the U.S. Congress passed the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act, which
authorized the President "to establish and maintain a total
embargo upon all trade between the United States and Cuba."6
States Corporations in a Post-Embargo Era, 23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 299, 301
(1999).
3. Anthony M. Solis, The Long Arm of U.S. Law: The Helms-Burton Act, 19 Loy.
L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 709, 712-13 (1997).
4. FOREIGN INVESTMENT ACT OF 1995 (Cuba), translated in 35 I.L.M. 331, 343
(1996) [hereinafter CFIA] (English translation with Introductory Note by Jorge A.
Vargas).
5. Coughlin, supra note 2, at 301.
6. Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(a)(1) (1996).
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Doubts soon arose, however, as to whether there was solid legal
foundation behind the Foreign Assistance Act to apply the
embargo to Americans acting outside the U.S. 7 Accordingly, the
authorization for the embargo was amended to give it additional
legal support under the Trading with the Enemy Act.8 After the
1963 Cuban Missile Crisis, a new comprehensive set of economic
regulations and prohibitions entitled "Cuban Assets Control Regu-
lations" (CACR)9 was enacted by Executive Order, but was never
formally passed by Congress. Therefore, the provisions of the
embargo under the CACR were open to revision or termination at
the discretion of the President of the United States, and thus as
international politics dictated. °
In 1996, however, after two small American airplanes were
shot down by Cuban fighter jets, President Clinton signed into law
the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, also known as
the Helms-Burton Act (Helms-Burton; the Act)." Today, the pro-
visions of Helms-Burton operate as the principal U.S. legal obsta-
cle to American investment in Cuban real estate.
B. Obstacles Under U.S. Law
1. U.S. Economic Embargo Under Helms-Burton
One of the express purposes of Helms-Burton is "to
strengthen international sanctions against the Castro govern-
ment."12 The Act primarily accomplishes this by codifying all
Executive Orders and Regulations concerning the economic
embargo of Cuba, including the prohibitions of the CACR."3
Therefore, under both Helms-Burton and the CACR, Ameri-
can law expressly bars "any person subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States" from conducting most business transactions
with Cuba or Cuban nationals, including all investment in Cuban
real estate. 4 Prohibited real estate transactions include those
which are "by, or on behalf of, or pursuant to the direction of...
[Cuba], or any national thereof," as well as transactions that
7. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Congress and Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act, 90 AM. J.
INT'L L. 419, 420 (1996).
8. Id. at 420.
9. Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515 (1963).
10. James M. Cooper, Creative Problem Solving and the Castro Conundrum, 28
CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 391, 400 (1998).
11. Helms-Burton Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091(1996).
12. 22 U.S.C. § 6022(2).
13. 22 U.S.C. § 6032(h).
14. 31 C.F.R. § 515.201.
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"involve property in which [Cuba], or any national thereof, has at
any time on or since the effective date of this section had any
interest of any nature whatsoever, direct or indirect."15 The
embargo applies to any U.S. citizen or permanent resident, wher-
ever they may be located, any person actually within the U.S., any
corporation organized under U.S. law, or any organization that is
owned or controlled by such persons or organizations.16 The flat
prohibition on virtually all business transactions under the
embargo provision of Helms-Burton is the primary legal barrier to
American investment in Cuban real estate.
2. U.S. Expropriation Claims Under the International
Claims Settlement Act and Helms-Burton
Expropriation claims of U.S. nationals present another con-
siderable obstacle to American investment in Cuban real estate.
Since 1949, the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, created
under the International Claims Settlement Act (ICSA), has
received and determined the validity and amount of claims by
U.S. nationals against the government of Cuba for losses resulting
from the nationalization or expropriation of property owned by
such nationals.17 ICSA claims require that the party bringing the
claim be a U.S. national at the time the property was confiscated."
For some time, this requirement effectively eliminated the claims
of Cuban-Americans who became U.S. nationals after their prop-
erty was expropriated.19
In an effort to correct this ICSA shortcoming2 ° and "to protect
United States nationals against confiscatory takings and the
wrongful trafficking in property confiscated by the Castro
regime,"21 Helms-Burton established a private right of action in
U.S. courts on behalf of any U.S. national who has a claim for
property expropriated by Cuba since January 1, 1959, against any
person who traffics in such property.22 While claims that have
been certified under the ICSA are given a presumption of validity
15. 31 C.F.R. §515.201(a). The "effective date of this section" is July 8, 1963. 31
C.F.R. § 515.201(d).
16. 31 C.F.R. § 515.329; Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, So, Your Client Wants To Go To
Havana .. , 6 NAFTA: L. & Bus. REV. AM. 277, 281 (2000).
17. International Claims Settlement Act, 22 U.S.C. § 1643b(a) (1950).
18. 22 U.S.C. § 1643c(a).
19. Antonio R. Zamora, Real Estate Investments in Cuba: Back to the Future, 11
FLA. J. INT'L L. 539, 553 (1998).
20. Travieso-Diaz, supra note 16, at 287.
21. 22 U.S.C. § 6022(6).
22. 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a); Lowenfeld, supra note 7, at 425.
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in private Helms-Burton actions for the amount certified, 23 Helms-
Burton does not limit the category of prospective claimants to par-
ties who were U.S. nationals at the time of expropriation.24
Though they may not bring an action against the Cuban govern-
ment under the ICSA, Cuban Americans and other parties who
were not U.S. nationals at the time their property was confiscated
may bring a Helms-Burton action against anyone who traffics in
their expropriated property.25
Further, the prospective liability under Helms-Burton is not
limited to foreign persons and organizations, "but also applies to
corporate officers of, principals of and shareholders with a control-
ling interest in an entity that has been involved in the trafficking
of confiscated property that is the subject of a claim by a U.S.
national."26 Though most successful expropriation claims are set-
tled in monetary damages and not by a return of the confiscated
property, under Helms-Burton, any party dealing in such property
is susceptible to monetary damages three times the value of the
property in question.27 In addition, aliens dealing in such property
may be denied admission to the United States.28
Therefore, the existence of such expropriation claims will sig-
nificantly affect the decisions of cautious American real estate
investors, most of whom want assurances of clear title. 29 "Clear
title basically means that there are no impediments to the
intended use of the property acquired, and that no one is going to
challenge the ownership interest created by the acquisition.""
Thus, to avoid the risk of considerable monetary damages, pro-
spective American investors will have to ensure that any real
property in which they are interested is not the subject of an
existing, pending, or threatened expropriation claim by a U.S.
national under the ICSA or Helms-Burton. "Some of the best real
estate in Cuba, approximately 1.5 to 2.0 million acres, is included
23. 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(2).
24. 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(5)(C). Still, parties that are eligible to file a claim under
the ICSA must do so as a prerequisite to filing a claim under Helms-Burton. 22
U.S.C. § 6082(a)(5)(A).
25. 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(5)(C); Zamora, supra note 19, at 552-53.
26. Harry L. Clark, Dealing With U.S. Extraterritorial Sanctions and Foreign
Countermeasures, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 61, 75 (1999).
27. 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(3)(c).
28. 22 U.S.C. § 6091(a).
29. Zamora, supra note 19, at 551.
30. Id.
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in the U.S. certified claims category,"31 and "[a]s long as property
titles remain unsettled, foreigners are going to perceive investing
in Cuba as a rather risky proposition and may be discouraged
from stepping into the country. '32 Thus, these expropriation
claims will continue to effectively inhibit American investment in
Cuban real estate by subjecting traffickers to substantial mone-
tary damages and hindering the acquisition of clear title.
C. Elimination of Obstacles Under U.S. Law
1. By the President
The codification of the embargo by Congress under Helms-
Burton gives it unquestionable legislative support, and therefore
removes the possibility that the President may unilaterally
tighten or loosen its prohibitions.33 Until the President suspends
the embargo upon a determination that a transition government
is in place,34 or terminates the embargo upon a determination that
a democratically elected government is in control," it will be ille-
gal under Helms-Burton and the CACR for Americans to invest in
Cuban real estate. The primary qualifications for a transition
government as defined under Helms-Burton is a Cuban govern-
ment that has legalized all political activity, has released all polit-
ical prisoners, is committed to organizing free and fair elections
for a new government, and does not include Fidel Castro. 6 The
more stringent conditions for a democratically elected government
require a government that results from free and fair elections
supervised by international observers, shows respect for human
rights, is moving towards a market-oriented economy, and has
made progress in returning expropriated property.37
Like the embargo provisions, the President may suspend the
Helms-Burton private rights of action upon a determination that a
transition government is in place,38 or may terminate such causes
of action upon a determination that a democratically elected gov-
ernment is in control 9.3 In fact, the President has repeatedly exer-
31. Id. at 552. Claims certified under the ICSA are given a presumption of
validity for the amount certified. 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(2).
32. Travieso-Diaz, supra note 16, at 288.
33. Cooper, supra note 10, at 400.
34. 22 U.S.C. § 6064(a). Suspension requires consultation with Congress. Id.
35. 22 U.S.C. § 6064(c).
36. 22 U.S.C. § 6065(a).
37. 22 U.S.C. § 6066.
38. 22 U.S.C. § 6082(h)(1)(A).
39. 22 U.S.C. § 6082(h)(1)(B).
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cised his authority to suspend the ability of U.S. nationals to
initiate suits against traffickers based on a determination that the
international community as a whole has taken "a series of steps to
promote democracy in Cuba."0 However, even if the President
were to suspend private rights of action under Helms-Burton,
such a suspension does not eliminate existing claims under the
ICSA or pending claims under Helms-Burton initiated prior to the
suspension.4 Further, the suspension of such lawsuits is only
temporary, and, when these lawsuits are suspended, there is
always a strong possibility that the suspension will later be lifted,
thereby exposing parties who invested in expropriated property in
the interim to significant liability. This threat of action, even dur-
ing a time of suspension, was strong enough to cause an Italian
telephone company, STET, to pay a U.S. corporate Helms-Burton
claimant, ITT, a rumored $25 million for a waiver of all claims by
ITT against STET for use of ITT's expropriated property. 2
Thus, before the President can terminate the embargo and
private right of action provisions under Helms-Burton, an
extraordinary governmental transformation must occur in Cuba.
Because changes of such magnitude take considerable time to
implement, the President will continue to be prevented from per-
manently eliminating obstacles to American investment in Cuban
real estate.
2. By U.S. Supreme Court
Many opponents of Helms-Burton claim that the private right
of action provision violates international law because it is an
unjustified extraterritorial application of U.S. law to foreign
nationals. If the U.S. Supreme Court has the opportunity to
review the validity of the Act, it could potentially invalidate provi-
sions of Helms-Burton, thereby removing certain obstacles to
American investment in Cuban real estate. However, in drafting
the Act, Congress anticipated this type of legal criticism and
referred to international law norms for justification.44
40. Jorge F. Nrez-L6pez & Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, The Helms-Burton Law and
Its Antidotes: A Classic Standoff?, 7 Sw. J. L. & TRADE Am. 95, 137-38 (2000).
41. 22 U.S.C. § 6082(h)(2).
42. Edwin D. Williamson, U.S. - EU Understanding on Helms-Burton: A Missed
Opportunity to Fix International Law On Property Rights, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 293,
303 (1999).
43. Franchesco Soto, The Helms-Burton Act: The Final Piece to Bring Down the
Tyrant's Regime, 8 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 237, 248-49 (2001).
44. Solis, supra note 3, at 721.
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The authors of Helms-Burton expected complaints that the
Act engaged in extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction.45 Thus,
Congress included a provision stating, "International law recog-
nizes that a nation has the ability to provide for rules of law with
respect to conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to
have substantial effect within its territory. '46 Thus, Congress
effectively employs the "effects doctrine" as a legal justification for
Helms-Burton's private rights of action.4"
Further, the act of state doctrine generally precludes U.S.
courts from inquiring into the validity of public acts that a recog-
nized sovereign power has committed within its own territory.48
However, the drafters of Helms-Burton anticipated the act of state
doctrine as another potential legal obstacle, 49 and thus expressly
stated that the act of state doctrine shall not preclude U.S. courts
from hearing Helms-Burton cases.5°
More important than these defenses to the Act's legal validity
is the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court has not had the opportu-
nity to make such a determination because of the President's
repeated exercise of his power to suspend the private rights of
action provision.5' President George W. Bush has followed this
trend, recently announcing his decision to continue the suspension
of these Helms-Burton actions. 52 Because of the drastic negative
international reaction expected if such private rights of action are
reinstated, 53 it is likely that the President will continue the sus-
pension, thereby removing the power of the U.S. Supreme Court
to review the legal validity of the Act. However, as is evidenced by
the ITT-STET case,54 the President's suspension, by itself, does
not remove the threat of a Helms-Burton suit, thereby maintain-
ing this chilling effect on American investment in Cuban real
estate.
45. Lowenfeld, supra note 7, at 430.
46. 22 U.S.C. § 6081(9).
47. See Soto, supra note 43, at 248-253.
48. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 443 (1986).
49. Solis, supra note 3, at 722-723.
50. 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(6).
51. Travieso-Diaz, supra note 16, at 289.
52. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, International Information Programs, Bush Informs
Congress of Need to Renew Helms-Burton Title III Suspension, available at http:/!
usinfo.state.gov/regional]/ar/us-cuba/burtonl7.htm (Jan. 17, 2002).
53. See generally Pdrez-Lopez & Travieso-Diaz, supra note 40; see generally Clark,
supra note 26.
54. Williamson, supra note 42, at 303.
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3. By U.S. Congress
Both the embargo and private right of action provisions of
Helms-Burton have received widespread domestic and interna-
tional criticism," and those who oppose these controversial
Helms-Burton provisions insist that Congress repeal the Act.56
Opponents of the embargo argue that it is ineffective in sparking
governmental transition in Cuba, and has only crippled the Cuban
economy, causing great suffering. 7 Critics also contend that the
embargo "provides Castro with a scapegoat, allowing him to blame
any economic hardships on the American blockade.""
International disapproval of the private right of action
against traffickers of expropriated property has been even
stronger. U.S. trading partners complain that this Helms-Burton
provision violates their sovereignty by exposing their citizens and
corporations to the extraterritorial application of American law.59
By exposing foreigners to monetary damages and possible exclu-
sion from U.S. territory, "[tihis legislation seeks to force foreign
businesses to participate in the United States economic embargo
of Cuba."60 In response to these provisions of Helms-Burton, the
European Union, Canada, Mexico, and other trading partners of
the U.S. have protested the Act. 1
Though in recent years this political and legal criticism may
have weakened pro-Helms-Burton forces,62 the Act continues to
enjoy considerable Congressional support. From the time of its
introduction, Helms-Burton received almost complete backing
from Republicans and, after the two small American planes were
shot down, it received widespread support from Democrats. 3
Also, a large Cuban-American population in Florida represents a
55. See generally Rolando J. Santiago, Y2K, The Millennium For a Revised U.S.-
Cuba Trade Policy: Grounds For Removing the Embargo, 6 NAFTA: L. & Bus. REV.
Am. 169 (2000); see also Jeffrey Dunning, The Helms-Burton Act: A Step in the Wrong
Direction for United States Policy Toward Cuba, 54 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L.
213 (1998).
56. See, e.g., Lucien J. Dhooge, Fiddling With Fidel: An Analysis of the Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, 14 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 575, 634
(1997).
57. Santiago, supra note 55, at 183.
58. Id. at 184.
59. Id. at 180.
60. Nrez-L6pez & Travieso-Diaz, supra note 40, at 107.
61. Santiago, supra note 55, at 180.
62. Zamora, supra note 19, at 550.
63. Dunning, supra note 55, at 223.
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powerful political lobbying force in defense of the Act.' "The
Cuban lobby, known as the Cuban American National Founda-
tion, is so powerful that when in full effect it can paralyze Con-
gress and even influence national trade policies."65 Thus, there
are still many Americans and politicians who continue to support
the Act because they believe that Helms-Burton is the best way to
accomplish its goal of generating positive change in Cuba.66
Whether or not the criticism of Helms-Burton is deserved,
Congress will not repeal the Act until the Cuban government
makes actual changes to its most fundamental political institu-
tions and policies. Even critics of Helms-Burton acknowledge that
"[i]t is critical to a post-embargo transition process that the Cuban
government concedes on the issues of human rights and political
freedom."67 Unfortunately, though Castro is willing to entertain
dialogue with the United States and discuss the various hot
issues, he refuses to acquiesce or to entertain compromise.68 In
passing Helms-Burton, Congress found that "[t]he Castro regime
has made it abundantly clear that it will not engage in any sub-
stantive political reforms that would lead to democracy, a market
economy, or an economic recovery."69 "The Castro government has
time and again proven that tyranny and oppression shall be the
standards by which [the Cuban government] shall be measured,
and [has] defiantly dare[d] the United States government to act."7°
The U.S. has acted by enacting Helms-Burton. At the time of
enactment, Congress was completely aware of Castro's horrid his-
tory, and yet it made firm commitments to both the American and
Cuban people that it would not relent or abandon its position until
the Cuban government is truly ready to change. After all, Con-
gress enacted Helms-Burton in order to assist the Cuban people in
regaining their freedom, to encourage free and fair democratic
elections in Cuba, and to protect U.S. nationals against confisca-
tory takings and the wrongful trafficking in expropriated prop-
erty.71 Because lifting the embargo would benefit Cuba much
more than the U.S.,7 2 Congress has no reason to repeal Helms-
64. Id.
65. Santiago, supra note 55, at 176.
66. See generally Soto, supra note 43.
67. Santiago, supra note 55, at 170-171.
68. Id. at 171.
69. 22 U.S.C. § 6021(3).
70. Soto, supra note 43, at 254.
71. 22 U.S.C. § 6022.
72. Santiago, supra note 55, at 170.
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Burton and abandon these commitments without a legitimate
effort on the part of the Cuban government to accomplish these
goals.
Thus, the President cannot terminate the embargo or private
right of action provisions of Helms-Burton until a democratically
elected government is in control in Cuba. Moreover, the U.S.
Supreme Court is powerless to overturn the Act while the Presi-
dential suspension continues. Finally, Congress is unwilling to
abandon its commitment to instigating change in Cuba and is
unwilling to repeal Helms-Burton until Cuba is in transition to a
free-market democracy. Therefore, U.S. legal obstacles to Ameri-
can investment in Cuban real estate will persist until Cuba is in
transition to a free-market democracy.
III. CUBAN LAW
Unfortunately, even if the U.S. legal obstacles under Helms-
Burton are eliminated in the near future, serious deficiencies in
current Cuban law will continue to prevent American investment
in Cuban real estate for a significant amount of time.
A. Cuban Legal History & Development
After Castro assumed power, Cuba was too busy integrating
with the Soviet bloc and enjoying its annual Russian subsidy to
consider further foreign investment. 3 However, when the eco-
nomic failures of the Soviet Union became apparent in the 1980s,
the Cuban government began to consider foreign investment from
non-communist countries. 4 In 1982, Cuba enacted the first for-
eign investment law of its revolutionary period, entitled "Regard-
ing Economic Associations Between Cuban and Foreign Entities"
(Law 50).'- Under Law 50, "foreign investors were allowed to own
a maximum of 49% in any joint venture, although most of the
major sectors of the Cuban economy were placed outside the reach
of foreign investors."76 Due to this limitation on ownership, as
well as Cuba's continued ties with the Soviet Union, Law 50 was
remarkably unsuccessful in promoting foreign investment.77
In 1992, after the end of the Cold War, the Cuban government
amended the Constitution of Cuba to recognize some forms of pri-
73. Zamora, supra note 1, at 58.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. CFIA, supra note 4, Introductory Note, at 333.
77. Zamora, supra note 1, at 58.
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vate property.78 Pursuant to these amendments, the Cuban For-
eign Investment Act (CFIA, the Act) was enacted in 1995 "[i]n
order to broaden and facilitate foreign participation in [Cuba's]
economy... for the fundamental purpose of achieving sustainable
development in the country and a recovery of the national
economy."79
Under the CFIA, foreigners, including Americans, are now
permitted to invest "in real estate and acquire ownership and
other property rights over that real estate."80 The Act allows for-
eign investment in Cuban real estate to be made by a joint ven-
ture, an international economic association contract, or the all-
new totally foreign capital company.1 Unlike prior Cuban law,
there is now no limitation of foreign ownership in joint ventures
between foreign investors and the Cuban government."2 Moreo-
ver, the totally foreign capital company, formed by creating a for-
eign subsidiary of a non-Cuban corporation or by creating a new
Cuban corporation,8 3 is completely new and may be created by for-
eign investors without any Cuban national ownership or contribu-
tion.' Further, the CFIA guarantees that foreign investors will be
protected from the uncompensated expropriation of property8 5
Finally, the Act guarantees that foreign investors will be able to
freely transfer profits86 or their ownership interest in certain
investment entities.8 7
Thus, on the surface, it seems as though the Cuban govern-
ment has made a significant step forward by eliminating previous
restrictions and risks to American investment in Cuban real
estate. This liberalization of Cuban foreign investment law has
78. CFIA, supra note 4, Introductory Note, at 332.
79. CFIA, supra note 4, Introductory Note,at 344.
80. CFIA, supra note 4, Ch. VI, art. 16.1, at 349.
81. CFIA, supra note 4, Ch. V, art. 12, at 347. The primary difference between the
joint venture and the international economic association contract is that a joint
venture results in the creation of a legal entity distinct from the original parties. The
international economic association contract does not create a distinct legal entity. See
CFIA, supra note 4, Ch. V, art. 13.1, at 347; see also CFIA, supra note 4, Ch. V, art.
14.1(a), at 348.
82. Zamora, supra note 1, at 59.
83. CFIA, supra note 4, Ch. V, art. 15.2, at 348.
84. Coughlin, supra note 2, at 311.
85. CFIA, supra note 4, Ch. III, art. 3, at 346.
86. CFIA, supra note 4, Ch. III, art. 8.1, at 346.
87. CFIA, supra note 4, Ch. III, arts. 6.1, 6.2, at 346. The Act guarantees the free
transfer of ownership interest in international economic association contracts and
totally foreign capital companies. It does not mention the free transfer of ownership
interest in joint ventures. See generally CFIA, supra note 4, Ch. III, at 346-347.
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spawned the construction of what appear to be free-market style
condominium apartments in downtown Havana.8 These real
estate projects were implemented by joint ventures between the
Cuban government and investors from Spain, Israel, and
Monaco. 9
The changes under the CFIA give the impression that Ameri-
can investors, barred by U.S. law from making similar invest-
ments, are being left behind because they are unable to take
advantage of such opportunities.90 Unfortunately, underlying
risks and obstacles in current Cuban law make foreign investment
opportunities in Cuban real estate much less attractive to
Americans.
B. Obstacles Under Cuban Law
1. Current Obstacles
Despite these encouraging developments, the CFIA is far
from perfect and still imposes significant constraints on American
investment in Cuban real estate. First, under the Act, foreign
investment in real estate is limited to property to be developed for
(i) housing or tourism for persons who are not permanent
residents of Cuba, (ii) housing or offices for foreign companies, or
(iii) general real estate development for tourism.91 The term tour-
ism, though not expressly defined in the CFIA, falls under the def-
inition of "tourist" used by the Cuban authorities: "[A] foreign
person who visits Cuba for at least 24 hours and [who] returns to
his/her place of residence after a visit for recreational purposes, to
visit friends or relatives, to attend a seminar or a conference or
some very limited business purposes."92 Therefore, with a few
exceptions,93 foreign investments in real estate for agriculture,
industry, land banking, and permanent residence are completely
prohibited by current Cuban law.
4
Next, Americans will be skeptical about investing in Cuban
88. Zamora, supra note 19, at 539.
89. Id. at 541.
90. Coughlin, supra note 2, at 299-300.
91. CFIA, supra note 4, Ch. VI, art. 16.2, at 349.
92. Zamora, supra note 19, at 543.
93. Prior to the enactment of the CFIA, the Cuban government authorized foreign
investment in agriculture, telecommunications, mining, and petroleum on a very
limited basis. Steven E. Hendrix, Tensions in Cuban Property Law, 20 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1996). Further, this foreign investment was actually
channeled toward production rather than the true ownership of real estate assets. Id.
94. See generally CFIA, Ch. VI, Art. 16, supra note 4, at 349.
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real estate because "[fioreign investors are still not permitted to
acquire title to the properties in which they invest."95 Though the
CFIA authorizes foreign investors to "acquire ownership and other
property rights" in Cuban real estate,96 the Act neither defines the
term "acquisition"97 nor mentions any transfer of title. Further,
while the CFIA guarantees the free transfer of profits and owner-
ship interest in the investment entities,9" it is silent regarding the
free transfer of the actual land. Thus, despite the immediate
impression that the Cuban government has authorized foreign fee
simple ownership of land,99 the real estate rights acquired by
investors are just long or medium term leases of the improve-
ments in which they invest."' Americans will not make large
investments in Cuban real estate when they are precluded from
acquiring certain title to such property.
Further, despite the Act's formal authorization of foreign
investment through a joint venture, international economic asso-
ciation contract, or totally foreign capital company, the approval of
the Cuban government, through the Executive Committee of the
Council of Ministers, is required for the creation of all foreign
investment entities.1"1 To utilize a totally foreign capital company
as an entity for foreign investment, the prior written approval of
the appropriate Cuban governmental body responsible for that
economic sector is also required.0 2 In the past, the individual
authorization of all foreign investment entities has always been a
protracted process, involving successive reviews by several agen-
cies, and with Fidel Castro as the ultimate decision-maker.0 3
After passing the CFIA, Castro admitted that he envisioned
Cuban state majority ownership as the rule and 100% foreign
95. Matias F. Travieso-Diaz & Alejandro Ferrate, Recommended Features of a
Foreign Investment Code for Cuba's Free Market Transition, 21 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 511, 528 (1996).
96. CFIA, supra note 4, Ch. VI, art. 16.1, at 349.
97. Travieso-Diaz & Ferrate, supra note 95, at 525.
98. See CFIA, supra note 4, Ch. III, arts. 6.1, 6.2, 8.1, at 346.
99. Some authors seem to believe that foreign investors may acquire title to
Cuban real estate, though there is no evidence of this in the CFIA. See Zamora, supra
note 19, at 546; see also Venera A. Gallousis, Cuba's Flirtatious Love Affair With
Foreign Investment: The Evolution of Laws 50 and 77, 5 TEx. Hisp. J.L. & POL'Y 81, 96
(2001).
100. Travieso-Diaz & Ferrate, supra note 95, at 525.
101. Coughlin, supra note 2, at 306.
102. Id. at 311.
103. Travieso-Diaz & Ferrate, supra note 95, at 527.
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ownership only in "exceptional cases."1 °4 In fact, only one wholly-
owned foreign enterprise has been allowed since the Act was
passed."' It therefore seems, as a general policy and practice, that
foreign investors are only welcome if they assume minority roles
in joint ventures with the Cuban government."°6 Thus, "[a] major
flaw in the Act is its failure to establish objective criteria for
approval of foreign investment entities, resulting in a bureau-
cratic and arbitrary approval process."107
Besides prescribing the terms under which each investment is
authorized, the Cuban government can randomly dictate when an
investment is to come to an end."0 8 Thus, the Castro regime can
terminate foreign investment entities essentially at will, with all
property in Cuba involved in the investment remaining in the
hands of the government."9
In addition, despite the CFIA's guarantee against the uncom-
pensated expropriation of property, confiscation is still permitted
"for reasons of the public good or in the interest of society, as
declared by the Government. 1 0 Though indemnification for
expropriated property is assured in freely convertible currency
equal to a mutually agreed upon commercial value,"' such an
assurance seems rather hollow in light of Cuba's communist his-
tory of uncompensated expropriation and Castro's reputation for
breaking promises. Though the Act purportedly holds the Cuban
government to its guarantee by providing for arbitration by an
international organization in the event the parties disagree as to
the value of the taken land," 2 such arbitration is an expensive and
futile process when Cuba itself does not observe international
law."' Moreover, the CFIA does not address the situation where
the parties are unable to agree on an arbitrator."4 Thus, despite
the express guarantees in the CFIA, investors should remain
104. See Mireya Navarro, Cuba Passes Law to Attract Greater Foreign Investment,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1995, at A12 (quoting Fidel Castro).
105. Travieso-Diaz, supra note 16, at 279.
106. Carlos Alberto Montaner, Castro Seeks Capital. Hold On to Your Wallet, WALL
ST. J. (EuR.), July, 28, 1998, at 8.
107. Coughlin, supra note 2, at 323.
108. Travieso Diaz & Ferrate, supra note 95, at 528.
109. Id.
110. CFIA, supra note 4, Ch. III, art. 3, at 346.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Montaner, supra note 106.
114. Gallousis, supra note 99, at 97.
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doubtful of Castro's promise to refrain from expropriating real
estate without indemnification.
Similarly, though the Act guarantees that foreign investors
will be able to freely transfer their interest in some investment
entities,"' such a transfer is only permitted when authorized by
the Cuban government.'16 This requisite governmental authoriza-
tion makes the dependability of any acquired ownership right
seem doubtful because it essentially precludes an investor in real
estate from selling his interest until the Castro regime approves.
Since investors in Cuban real estate do not acquire title to the
land in which they invest, ownership interests in investment enti-
ties can often be the most valuable marketable asset. Therefore,
such a restriction on the alienability of ownership interests in real
estate could effectively bar a foreign investor from ever realizing
the true value of an investment by precluding him from openly
marketing his interest.
Finally, the most significant current obstacle to American
investment in Cuban real estate is the incompatibility of foreign
private ownership with a communist Cuban society and economy.
For one, foreign investment entities pay for labor by first paying
the Cuban government in American dollars, which in turn pays
the actual employees in Cuban pesos."7 Under this lopsided
arrangement, the Castro administration retains 95% of the
wages."' The governmental discrimination against Cuban citi-
zens has generated a deep animosity towards foreign investors,
causing riots and the vandalism of foreign investment projects." 9
More importantly, as the construction of foreign real estate
investment projects progressed, Cuban officials began to worry
"that the trend toward private-property ownership represented a
dangerous precedent in a country whose own citizens aren't
allowed to buy or sell their homes."2 ° Moreover, the Cuban gov-
ernment has stated that a Cuban capitalist class would generate
inequalities, and thus prohibits foreign investors from creating
115. Though the CFIA guarantees the free transfer of ownership interest in
international economic association contracts and totally foreign capital companies, it
is silent as to a guarantee of the free transfer of ownership interest in joint ventures.
This silence further reduces the reliability of other express guarantees. See generally
CFIA, supra note 4, Ch. III, at 346.
116. CFIA, supra note 4, Ch. III, arts. 6.1, 6.2, at 346.
117. Montaner, supra note 106.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Will Castro Respond to U.S. Softening, Cuba May Prefer to Keep the U.S. as a
Boogeyman, WALL ST. J., Jul. 18, 2000, at A14.
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partnerships with Cuban citizens.' 2 ' This tension between com-
munism and foreign private ownership caused the Cuban govern-
ment to declare a "freeze" on all foreign investment in residential
real estate, halting this type of investment in order to analyze the
impact of private ownership on the country. 2 2 Though the freeze
on foreign investment activity only applies to new investments in
residential real estate, unsold apartments and condominiums will
be purchased by Cuba and subsequently leased. 123 Thus, the
inherent conflict between the communist character of the Cuban
economy and foreign private ownership of real property creates an
uncertain and unstable setting that prevents Americans from con-
fidently investing in Cuban real estate.
Consequently, despite the significant step the Cuban govern-
ment took in passing the CFIA, neither the country nor its legal
system is currently ready for foreign investment in real estate.
Even non-American foreign investors, who are less inhibited by
U.S. law, retreat from investing in Cuba "because of the legal
uncertainty, the material obstacles, the stubbornness of the
bureaucracy and the lack of any entrepreneurial culture."24 Thus,
before Americans can invest in Cuban real estate with certainty,
Cuba will need to undergo a "far greater liberalization to the coun-
try's foreign investment regime" than the CFIA provides. 25
2. Future Obstacles
Without assistance from the Soviet Union or the United
States, the communist Cuban economy continues to struggle,'26
creating constant international pressure for liberalization and
transformation. Because Castro cannot live forever, someday
Cuba will be free of his grasp and hopefully able to transform into
a free-market democracy.127 Unfortunately, "the laws in effect in
121. Montaner, supra note 106.
122. See Dalia Acosta, Real Estate Freeze Renews Question of Property, INTER PRESS
SERV., Jun. 1, 2000, available at 2000 WL 4091459; Doreen Hemlock, Cuban Officials
Spell Out Terms for Foreign Trade, Investment, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIB. Bus. NEWS,
Sep. 11, 1998, available at 1998 WL 16336709; Freeze on Residential Property
Investment, CARIBBEAN UPDATE, Jun. 1, 2000, available at 2000 WL 2138068.
123. Acosta, supra note 122.
124. Montaner, supra note 106.
125. Travieso-Diaz & Ferrate, supra note 95, at 528.
126. See Cuban Economy In Recession With Rising Oil Prices & Falling Export &
Tourism Income, NOTICEN: CENT. AM. & CARIBBEAN AFF., Jan. 23, 2003, available at
2003 WL 12454470; see also Lawrence Solomon, Cuba's Cruel Joke, NAT'L POST, Jan.
11, 2003, available at 2003 WL 3273890.
127. See Rudi Dornbusch, Getting Ready For Cuba After Castro, Bus. WK., May 24,
1993, available at 1993 WL 2141956; see also Soto, supra note 43, at 253-254.
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Cuba at this time are both obsolete (in that they do not represent
currently accepted legal and business practices throughout the
world) and so infused with socialist dogma that they would need to
be replaced with suitable legislation at the earliest possible
time."128  Thus, Cuban law will need to undergo substantial
change in order to form a legal infrastructure conducive to Ameri-
can investment in real estate.
129
The first and most important legal change required is the
drafting of a new permanent constitution. 3 ° The last pre-Revolu-
tionary Cuban constitution, enacted in 1940, was replaced by suc-
cessive socialist constitutions that established a "centrally-
planned, state-owned, and state-controlled economy." "' Thus, to
achieve a transition to a free-market economy, Cuba must enact a
new constitution following a constitutional convention. 3 2 A new
Cuban constitution would "have to expressly declare the country's
commitment to freedom of economic activity and the protection of
private property rights."133 Unfortunately, because the process of
drafting a new constitution could take up to two to three years,3
Americans will be further delayed from securely investing in
Cuban real estate.
Next, the new Cuban government will have to negotiate a set-
tlement with the international community regarding expropria-
tion claims. 3 A system providing remedies for the property
confiscations must provide predictable and fair treatment to all
claimants, create an administration of secure and marketable
rights to property, promote prompt privatization of state-held
assets, and keep the total cost of the remedies within the financial
means of the country.'36 Unfortunately, unless payment is
delayed for a substantial period of time, Cuba's economic condition
128. Matias Travieso-Diaz & Steven R. Escobar, Cuba's Transition to a Free-Market
Democracy: A Survey of Required Changes to Laws and Legal Institutions, 5 DuKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 379, 384 (1995).
129. Id. at 379.
130. Id. at 382.
131. Matias Travieso-Diaz & Stephan M. Bleisteiner, Some Lessons for Cuba from
the Legal Changes in Eastern Europe, 3 U. MIAMI Y.B. INT'L L. 173, 186 (1996).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Travieso-Diaz & Escobar, supra note 128, at 382.
135. Jose A. Ortiz, The Illegal Expropriation of Property in Cuba: A Historical and
Legal Analysis of the Takings and a Survey of Restitution Schemes For a Post-
Socialist Cuba, 22 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 321, 322 (2000).
136. Matias Travieso-Diaz, Some Legal and Practical Issues in the Resolution of
Cuban Nationals' Expropriation Claims Against Cuba, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 217,
225.
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will not allow more than token compensation to the former own-
ers. 137 Hopefully, the resolution of claims of former land-owners
will be through compensation instead of through the return of
property so that the ownership rights of current and future own-
ers do not remain in jeopardy. 138 Even if such claimants are will-
ing to settle, resolution of these claims will be complicated by the
passage of time and by the fact that most expropriated property
has been destroyed, modified, or merged with other property.
39
Thus, these outstanding claims will not be resolved for a long time
and will continue to operate as an obstacle by clouding title to
Cuban real estate.1
40
Additionally, before Americans can safely invest in Cuban
real estate, the nation will have to enact a new foreign investment
act.' This act should learn from the CFIA's shortcomings by
eliminating all prior-approval requirements for foreign invest-
ment.' Also, the new act should outline exactly what types of
business activities, including real estate transactions, foreign
investors are allowed to carry out.143 Lastly, a new foreign invest-
ment act should include guarantees similar to those in the CFIA.
These guarantees, however, should be authored by a governmen-
tal source more reputable than Castro.
4 4
Unfortunately, many more legal developments must take
place before Americans can easily and confidently invest in Cuban
real estate. Fortunately, some of Cuba's pre-Revolutionary laws
are still technically valid and provide a framework for future pri-
vate Cuban real estate law. 45 For example, Cuba's 1952 Condo-
minium Law contains provisions on the critical elements of
modern condominium ownership such as co-ownership of common
elements, horizontal division of property, easements, and owners'
rights.'46 Other well-developed areas of pre-Castro Cuban law
include a registry of property and real estate mortgage law. 47
While some legal foundations exist which can be built upon during
Cuba's transition to a free-market democracy, there is a much
137. Id. at 29.
138. Zamora, supra note 19, at 556.
139. Travieso-Diaz & Escobar, supra note 128, at 411.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 413.
142. Id. at 414.
143. Id. at 415.
144. Id. at 416.
145. Zamora, supra note 19, at 544-545.
146. Id. at 545.
147. Id. at 545-546.
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longer list of legal gaps with no precedent on which to rely. A par-
tial enumeration of new laws that need to be enacted includes
accounting, administrative, immigration, military, banking, civil,
commercial, customs, education, election, environmental, judicial
reform, insurance, land use, maritime, mining, penal, occupa-
tional health and safety, public contract, public labor, securities,
social security, telecommunications, and transportation law.
148
Thus, Cuba will have to completely reconstruct its entire legal
infrastructure, and until this immense project is completed Amer-
icans will be unable to invest in Cuban real estate with confidence
and certainty.
IV. CONCLUSION
Significant obstacles in both U.S. and Cuban law currently
prevent American investment in Cuban real estate. In the U.S.,
the economic embargo, codified under the Helms-Burton Act, com-
pletely bars all business transactions with Cuba. Were it not for
the embargo, the Act's private right of action provisions impede
foreign investment in real estate by exposing investors to consid-
erable liability for trafficking in property that is the subject of
expropriation claims. Neither the President, nor the Supreme
Court, nor Congress will eliminate these obstacles under Helms-
Burton until Cuba is in transition to free-market democracy.
In Cuba, despite the liberalization of the law under the CFIA,
significant legal shortcomings persist and create further restric-
tions to American investment in Cuban real estate. Most types of
real estate investments, including those for agriculture, industry,
and land banking remain off limits for foreign investors. More
importantly, foreigners are unable to acquire title to the property
in which they invest. Also, prior governmental approval is
required for all foreign investments. Further, despite formal
guarantees, foreigners are skeptical of investing in an unstable
and uncertain political setting. Castro's communist government
and economy are incompatible with foreign private ownership,
and Cuba will have to completely revise its legal infrastructure to
remedy this inherent conflict. Americans will be unwilling to
invest in Cuban real estate until a political and legal setting exists
that is stable enough to convince foreigners that their investments
are secure.
The bottom line is that the elimination of both nations' legal
148. Travieso-Diaz & Escobar, supra note 128, at 419-420.
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obstacles cannot occur while Castro and communism still govern
Cuba. Despite the CFIA's superficial liberalization of Cuban law,
the Cuban economy struggles without Soviet support and the Act
is likely no more than one of Castro's ploys to lure foreign funds by
convincing the rest of the world that Cuba is a safe locale for for-
eign investment. Though one can see the construction of luxury
condominium buildings in downtown Havana, the Cuban govern-
ment has already put a freeze on all foreign investment in residen-
tial real estate, one of the few types of land in which foreigners
may invest. This freeze is concrete evidence of the intrinsic con-
flict between communism and the private ownership of real
estate. Other foreign real estate investors are not surpassing
American investors because Cuba does not currently offer a set-
ting conducive to sound and secure foreign investment in real
property. "Cuba will be a place to make profit when Castro is
gone, when power has been transferred in a peaceful and orderly
fashion, and when the course of transition toward democracy and
a market economy has been clearly defined - and only then."'49
Such progress is not impossible. After all, Castro is nearing the
end of his life and everyday the need for foreign capital grows
stronger. Still, Castro's rule continues, Helms-Burton remains
good law, and the legal obstacles to American investment in
Cuban real estate endure. Moreover, even when Cuba is finally
ready to become a free-market democracy, it will be a complex and
prolonged process requiring the reconstruction of virtually every
field of Cuban law. Though attractive, profitable real estate
investments will someday be available in Cuba, right now pro-
spective American investors are left saying, "It's close, but no
cigar."
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